Tikka Khan’s Controversial Suggestion
Just one week before the fall of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s government, a meeting was held in which Bhutto’s advisor and former Army Chief, General Tikka Khan, presented a highly controversial suggestion for controlling the opposition. He advised:
“Sir, my recommendation is that if we eliminate five to six thousand opposition workers, the rest will cool down and stay at home.”
This shocking remark was later recorded by Bhutto’s Information Minister, Kausar Niazi, in his book. However, General Faiz Ali Chishti, who was also present in that meeting, narrated a slightly different version in his memoir Betrayal of Another Kind. According to him, General Tikka Khan suggested that the killing of merely two to three hundred opposition workers would be enough to restore order.
General Zia-ul-Haq, recalling this incident on several occasions, remarked that it was at this very moment he began contemplating the removal of Bhutto’s government. In Zia’s view, Bhutto and his advisors seemed inclined towards unleashing unrest in the country.
Bhutto’s Meeting with Senior Generals
Nonetheless, in his book The Last Days of Premier Bhutto, Kausar Niazi emphasized that neither Bhutto nor any other participant of that meeting endorsed Tikka Khan’s proposal.
But what made the meeting significant was that, in the presence of senior army officers and close advisors, Bhutto shared with General Zia and his generals a draft of the opposition alliance (Pakistan National Alliance – PNA) demands. These included critical points such as:
Withdrawal of the military from Balochistan
Dismissal of the Hyderabad Tribunal case
According to Kausar Niazi, the generals viewed this draft as equivalent to another “Fall of Dhaka” — a reference to General Niazi signing the surrender document before Indian General Aurora in 1971.
Planning the Coup: July 4th, 1977
General Faiz Ali Chishti, then Commander of 10 Corps, recounts in Betrayal of Another Kind that on the evening of July 4th, around 9:30 p.m., Major General K. M. Arif drove him and Major General Riaz Khan to the Army House to meet General Zia. There, Zia informed them that he was ready to issue orders for assuming control of the government.
Major General K. M. Arif, in his own book Working with Zia: Pakistan’s Power Politics, 1977–1988, provides further insight. He narrates that General Faiz Chishti and Major General Riaz brought him to Zia that evening. Calm and composed, Zia disclosed that the military operation to overthrow Bhutto’s government would be launched that very night.
As Gen Arif notes:
“Since both the government and the opposition had agreed to disagree, we sipped tea, shared jokes, and indulged in light conversation while waiting for the coup to unfold.”
Later that night, Zia summoned the available commanders and, in a formal address, stated that given the worsening national situation and deteriorating law and order, the army had decided to take over. He declared that he had ordered 10 Corps Commander, General Chishti, to ensure compliance with his directives by placing the political leadership under protective custody.
The Night of the Coup
Renowned historian Ayesha Jalal, in her book The Struggle for Pakistan, describes the sequence of events on the night of July 4th. At 11:30 p.m., Bhutto, waving a thick cigar and exhaling smoke, addressed a press conference announcing that a settlement with the opposition would be finalized the next morning.
The press conference concluded at 12:30 a.m., after which Bhutto’s associates left the Prime Minister’s House for their residences around 1:30 a.m.
As the clock struck midnight and the date changed from July 4th to July 5th, Pakistan’s political landscape, too, was preparing for a dramatic turn.
Operation Fair Play Begins
General Faiz Ali Chishti recalls that by the time the coup was put into motion, it was already too late for Bhutto’s government. General Zia had already issued orders to remove the Prime Minister through martial law. On the night of July 5th, at 1:00 a.m., Operation Fair Play officially began — by then, the next day’s newspapers had already gone to print.
When handing over the command of the operation to the crucial 10th Corps, General Zia told General Faiz Ali Chishti:
“Murshid, Marwa na dena. (Master, don’t let me down.)”
Chishti, in his memoir, explains the background of this famous remark. According to him, Zia was deeply fearful of failure. On the night of the coup, Zia’s entire family was not in Pakistan. Using the pretext of his daughter’s medical treatment, Zia had sent his wife, two sons, and three daughters to the United Kingdom. In case the coup failed, he feared for both his personal safety and his family’s future.
Suspicion of Zia’s Escape Plan
General Chishti further narrates that on the night of the coup, his Corps Intelligence Chief informed him that a Puma helicopter stationed at Dhamiak, near Rawalpindi, was ready for takeoff at short notice. Initially, he speculated whether it might be for the Prime Minister or for Zia.
It could not have been for Bhutto, as the Prime Minister had no idea what was happening inside the military, nor could he abandon his family in such a manner.
The possibility pointed towards General Zia himself, who had staked everything on the success of the coup.
To ensure control, Chishti ordered his intelligence chief to keep strict watch over the helicopter and prevent it from taking off — regardless of who attempted to board it.
Troops Move Into Action
According to Kausar Niazi, at 2:30 a.m., army trucks began moving from General Headquarters (GHQ), apparently monitoring every development inside the Prime Minister’s House. Earlier, at 2:15 a.m., under orders from 10th Corps Commander General Chishti, local Brigade Commander Brigadier Imtiazullah Warraich activated the coup plan.
By this time, soldiers of Operation Fair Play had already left their barracks in military trucks and taken positions on the main roads of Islamabad and Rawalpindi.
Bhutto Realizes the Situation
At exactly 2:30 a.m., Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi informed Bhutto over the phone that military convoys were moving through the streets of Islamabad. At the same time, the Prime Minister’s staff noticed that the police detail guarding the Prime Minister’s House had mysteriously disappeared, replaced instead by armed army commandos encircling the premises.
Troops of the 111 Brigade swiftly moved in, detaining both government and opposition leaders and respectfully escorting them to the Army Officers’ Mess at Chaklala, Rawalpindi. There, they were served fresh tea. Remarkably, not a single shot was fired throughout the operation.
Bhutto’s Calls to the Army
When Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was first informed of the army’s takeover, he immediately tried calling Brigade Commander Imtiazullah Warraich. From Warraich’s residence, the reply came that he had gone to GHQ.
Bhutto then attempted to contact General Zia at the Army House, but was told once again that the General had gone to GHQ. It was at this moment that Bhutto realized:
“The carpet has been pulled from beneath my feet.”
The Final Conversation Between Bhutto and Zia
Eventually, Bhutto managed to reach General Zia at GHQ. After a long wait on the line, Zia finally came on and, in a calm voice, Bhutto asked:
“What is happening? I have heard that the army has moved. Is this true?”
For the first time, General Zia replied openly:
“You have heard correctly, Sir. I regret to say that what is happening was unavoidable.”
He reassured Bhutto by promising:
“I will hold elections within ninety days. You will once again become the Prime Minister, and I will be the one saluting you.”
Zia then politely asked Bhutto:
“Sir, where would you prefer to go — Murree, Larkana, or Karachi?”
Bhutto replied:
“Murree.”
To which Zia responded:
“Very well, Sir. Tomorrow morning, you will be escorted to the Government House in Murree.”
Bhutto’s Family Learns of the Coup
In his book Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan, Stanley Wolpert describes how Bhutto’s family reacted when they learned of the military coup. Begum Nusrat Bhutto immediately rushed to protect her children, while Bhutto’s eldest son, Mir Murtaza, emotionally declared his intent to resist the military takeover.
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto firmly stopped him, warning:
“Never even think of resisting the military. We must not give them an excuse to justify our killing.”
At that moment, Bhutto’s thoughts turned to the tragic fate of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman — the founding father of Bangladesh — and his family, who had been massacred during a military coup.
By now, the Prime Minister’s House was under the “protective custody” of the 111 Brigade.
Political Leaders Taken into Custody
Soon after, soldiers of the Pakistan Army respectfully placed the country’s political leadership under protective detention.
According to Shuja Nawaz in his book Crossed Swords, the 111 Brigade not only detained politicians but also took into custody General Ghulam Jilani, the head of Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency. Nawaz further writes that after calling Bhutto, General Zia phoned the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Sharif, who was still unaware of the unfolding events.
The conversation went as follows:
Zia: “Sir, I have done it.”
Gen. Sharif: “Done what?” (angrily)
Zia: “Removed Bhutto.”
Gen. Sharif: “So why are you calling me now?”
Zia explained:
“Sir, you served during General Ayub’s martial law. Please guide us on how to implement martial law properly.”
In response, General Sharif abruptly hung up the phone.
Attempts to Resist Protective Custody
On the night of the coup, a few political advisors attempted to hide or put up mild resistance. General Faiz Chishti recalls that apart from Ghulam Mustafa Khar and General Tikka Khan, the detachment commanders faced little difficulty in locating and securing political leaders.
Mustafa Khar was difficult to track down but was eventually taken into custody.
General Tikka Khan created considerable commotion, refusing to accept protective custody and openly challenging the orders of the Army Chief. Only after officers firmly requested, “Sir, please cooperate,” did he finally step out of his residence.
Bhutto’s Final Phone Call
According to Kausar Niazi, after speaking with General Zia, Bhutto made one last phone call — to his advisor, Mustafa Khar. Speaking from an undisclosed location in Islamabad, Khar began:
“Sir, I have heard that…” —
But before he could finish, the line suddenly went dead. Either it was cut, or deliberately disconnected.
And thus, as Niazi puts it:
“The night of the generals had begun.”
Conclusion
The military coup of July 5, 1977, known as Operation Fair Play, marked one of the most decisive turning points in Pakistan’s political history. General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, who had once been elevated by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto himself, removed his benefactor under the pretext of restoring order and holding fresh elections within ninety days. Those elections never took place during Bhutto’s lifetime.
Instead, Bhutto — the charismatic founder of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and architect of Pakistan’s 1973 Constitution — found himself isolated, under arrest, and eventually facing a controversial trial that would end with his execution in 1979.
Historians such as Stanley Wolpert, Shuja Nawaz, and Ayesha Jalal highlight how the coup was not merely the result of opposition protests but also a reflection of civil–military imbalance that continues to shape Pakistan’s political landscape. From General Tikka Khan’s reckless proposal to the quiet but calculated planning of General Zia, the coup was a stark reminder of how fragile democratic institutions remained in the country.
For Bhutto and his family, the night of July 5th was the beginning of a long tragedy — one that not only altered the destiny of the Bhutto family but also set Pakistan on a course of prolonged military rule, Islamization policies, and new power struggles.
The October 12, 1999 Military Coup: Nawaz Sharif vs. Pervez Musharraf’s
Nawaz Sharif & PMLN’s Turbulent Era (1990-1993): Military Coups, Bank Scandals & Survival Tactics
References
Gen Zia Ul Haq Martial Law & Military Coup in Pakistan 5 July 1977 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto | Wisdom House, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eL5A-0ikplQ
Chishti, Faiz Ali. Betrayals of Another Kind: Pakistan, Politics, and Military Rulers. New Delhi: Vision Books, 1989.
Nawaz, Shuja. Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Niazi, Kausar. Last Days of Premier Bhutto. Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1994.
Wolpert, Stanley. Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Jalal, Ayesha. The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014.
Arif, K. M. Working with Zia: Pakistan’s Power Politics, 1977–1988. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995.
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