Why Did Nawaz Sharif Choose General Pervez Musharraf? | The 1999 Military Coup In Pakistan (PMLN Series Part 4) |

Read Part 3 of Political History of Nawaz Sharif and PMLN

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Musharraf’s Pistol’s Aim

Just one month before the ousting of Nawaz Sharif’s government in 1999, Chief of Army Staff General Pervez Musharraf was standing in the lobby of the Shangri-La Hotel in Skardu, holding an Italian laser-guided pistol. While showing the pistol to a minister, he said,
“The aim of this pistol never misses.”
From behind, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif placed his hand on the shoulder of his Army Chief and, with a loaded expression, asked,
“Who are you aiming at?”
A tense silence spread through the room.
The very next month, on the sensational evening of October 12, 1999, Musharraf’s loyal genrals cornered Nawaz and his allies in the Prime Minister House, bringing his government to an end.

Nawaz Sharif & Army Chiefs: A History of Mistrust

Nawaz Sharif, who had also earned name for being dismissed from the Prime Ministership three times due to his indifferent relations with his Army Chiefs, had a grievance in 1999 as well: he had tried to remove Musharraf while he was out of the country. Loyal generals of Musharraf, on that day, skillfully neutralized Nawaz Sharif’s powers by undermining his government.
In this article, we will discuss these events in detail.
If we take a look at Nawaz Sharif’s political history, one thing becomes very clear: as Prime Minister, he was never able to foster a relationship of deep trust with his Army Chiefs. However, political researchers point out that he himself was a product of the same establishment, meaning he entered Pakistan’s political landscape with the support of the military establishment.

In October 1998, exactly one year before Musharraf’s military coup, Nawaz Sharif had grown weary of his constitutionally-minded Chief of Army Staff, General Jehangir Karamat. Karamat is counted among the few generals in Pakistan’s history who prioritize the constitution. On this occasion, Karamat chose to resign. It is worth noting that he was reportedly motivated within armed forces circles to impose martial law. However, he refrained from doing so, upholding the constitution instead.

Nawaz’s Calculated Choice: Why Pervez Musharraf

Owen Bennett Jones, in his book Pakistan: Eye of the Storm, writes that in August 1998 (two months before Karamat’s dismissal), the Corps Commander Mangla, General Musharraf, used some of his political connections to secure a meeting with Nawaz Sharif to present himself as a potential successor.
Since Musharraf was an Urdu-speaking officer whose family came to Pakistan during the partition of India, Nawaz hoped that Musharraf would fail to build a strong power base within the Punjabi-majority army. Owen Bennett Jones says that while ethnic connections in the Pakistani army are strong, loyalty to the institution itself is considered far more important.

History shows that in 1976, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto made the migrant General Zia the Army Chief for the same reason. He thought that Zia would have almost no support base in the Punjabi-majority army and would not rebel against him.
But Bhutto’s assumption was wrong. At the time of Zia’s coup, the generals put their ethnic backgrounds aside. They stood firmly with the institution, proved their loyalty, and overthrew Bhutto’s government. Later, with the support of his generals, Zia had Bhutto executed.

Besides Musharraf, Nawaz Sharif also liked General Ziauddin Butt from the Engineering Corps. However, because he did not have command experience in the Infantry Corps, he could not become Army Chief.

In this scenario, General Pervez Musharraf was the best option available to Nawaz Sharif, who considered him an excellent choice. Sharif began to see Musharraf as a potentially loyal and submissive Army Chief.

However, on October 6, 1998, Musharraf was given the rank of Army Chief. Meanwhile, Nawaz Sharif appointed his other favored officer, General Ziauddin Butt, as the Director-General of Pakistan’s powerful intelligence agency, the ISI.

Kargil War and Cracks in the Foundation

Musharraf was a former commando. It is said that throughout his career, he rarely showed much respect for his senior officers. Perhaps Nawaz Sharif had not factored in this aspect of Musharraf’s past.

Once Musharraf became Army Chief, he started visiting military bases and forward posts, behaving with his typical commando style. He began spending less and less time with his benefactor, the Prime Minister. Nawaz Sharif, who wanted to see his Army Chief as a subordinate, found him slipping out of his control.

Owen Bennett Jones says that for his part, Musharraf neither respected nor admired Nawaz. Like many of his senior military colleagues, he viewed the Prime Minister as an incompetent power addict who was failing to manage the country’s economic progress.

Despite this, Musharraf kept his focus on military matters. His actions suggested he was planning something big. He was closely monitoring the situation in Kashmir and the northern areas. The result of all this was the Kargil War.

In this campaign, Pakistan initially sent its soldiers disguised as Kashmiri mujahideen. In May 1999, they seized positions in the Kargil mountains, bringing the only road connecting Indian Kashmir to Leh and Ladakh within direct firing range. This move threatened India’s supply line to Leh and Ladakh.

India responded with a full-scale military operation. As pressure mounted on Pakistan’s strategists over the Kargil situation, Nawaz Sharif himself called the American president and flew to meet him on July 4, 1999, to plead for a safe way to withdraw their troops from Kargil.

Far from offering help, President Clinton instead scolded him, stating there would be no talks with India on this matter and that he must pull his forces out immediately. Furthermore, Clinton pressured Nawaz Sharif to reduce cooperation with the Taliban government in Afghanistan and to help the U.S. capture Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, who was based there.

The Blame Game: “Victory Has Many Fathers, But Defeat is an Orphan”

The phrase “we went for prayers but ended up with fasts stuck in our throats” perfectly captures this disastrous outcome. Pakistan was forced to withdraw its troops from Kargil, and the operation was declared a victory.

But if Kargil was a victory, why were the soldiers called back? This was the fundamental question the public began asking.

After the campaign, when Musharraf began visiting army bases, he was repeatedly confronted with the same question from his soldiers: ‘If Kargil was a victory, then why did we tell our men to come down from the peaks?’

Musharraf would respond by placing the entire blame on the Prime Minister, saying it was his mistake and that the army had no choice but to follow the Prime Minister’s orders.

Owen Bennett Jones writes that Musharraf’s reaction was ridiculous. The decision to withdraw from Kargil was made after full consultation with Musharraf, who had not raised any serious objections at the time.

Meanwhile, Nawaz Sharif claimed he knew nothing about the Kargil war. He said he only found out when Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee called him to say, “Your army has climbed onto our peaks in Kargil.”

As the saying goes:
“Victory has many fathers, but defeat is an orphan.”

This is exactly what was happening with the Kargil incident. Neither the Prime Minister nor the Chief of Army Staff was willing to take responsibility for it; instead, they were blaming each other.

Military Coup Preparations

And so, the Kargil incident became a point of major contention between the two. By early September 1999, Once again, Nawaz Sharif had lost all trust in his Army Chief, Pervez Musharraf. It was just a year earlier, in October 1998, that he had, with a heavy heart, dismissed his previous Army Chief, General Jehangir Karamat.
October had arrived once more, and Nawaz’s patience had, once again, run out. But this time, he was facing a much more difficult man to handle. On the other side was General Musharraf, a former commando known for showing little deference to his seniors. After spending a year together, Nawaz understood this very well.

Tension was simmering beneath the surface on both sides. The game was afoot, and the battle lines were drawn. Both men were simply waiting to see who would make the first move.

Nawaz Sharif was looking for a golden opportunity to sideline Musharraf and save his government at the same time. Meanwhile, Musharraf was watching closely, waiting for Nawaz to provoke him so he could use it as a justification to move against the Prime Minister.

The period of September-October 1999 was like a scene where the two were sitting across from each other in a staring contest, each waiting for the other to blink first and show weakness.

Musharraf began to gauge the loyalty of the other military leaders. In an informal meeting with the head of the Navy, he described Nawaz Sharif as incompetent to run the country. Admiral Fasih Bokhari got the clear impression that Musharraf was asking if he could count on the Navy’s support in case of a coup.
Nawaz’s fears were confirmed by some of his loyal generals. The Corps Commander of Quetta, General Tariq Pervez, had also warned Nawaz about the danger from Musharraf. General Tariq’s cousin, Raja Nadir Pervez, was Nawaz’s Communications Minister.

General Tariq Pervez warned Sharif that if he moved against Musharraf, the army would launch a full-scale attack on Nawaz in return. Completely unsettled, Nawaz Sharif asked his most trusted political ally, Senator Saifur Rahman, for help. Saif focused his efforts on Musharraf, tapping his phones and monitoring his movements.

A Cry for Help: The Desperate Mission to Washington

Nawaz Sharif then turned his attention to Washington. He wanted to warn the Americans that Pakistan’s democratic government was in danger. The Prime Minister knew that if he sent such a message through official Foreign Office channels, it would be relayed back to the army within minutes. So, he decided to send a more trusted and convincing messenger: his brother, Shehbaz.

Shehbaz arrived in Washington on September 17 and informed the State Department about the danger of a coup. Shahbaz reminded the Americans that on July 4, 1999, Nawaz Sharif had withdrawn Pakistani troops from Kargil at President Clinton’s choice. Shehbaz argued that the Prime Minister was now paying a heavy political price for that decision. Then Shehbaz asked them, “Do you know who was responsible for Kargil?”

He then answered his own question: “None other than the Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, General Musharraf. And now he is threatening our democratically elected government. Washington has a moral duty to help us.”

Shehbaz Sharif also made a crucial offer. He told the Americans that the Pakistani government was prepared to take a harder line against the Taliban government in Afghanistan.

Owen Bennett Jones says that on this occasion, Shahbaz not only promised cooperation in capturing or killing Osama bin Laden but also presented a plan for how American forces, with the help of Pakistani soldiers, could reach bin Laden’s secret hideout.

On September 20, Washington said it stood with democracy in Pakistan. However, the Americans privately told Shahbaz Sharif that they should settle all their differences with Musharraf.

After this trip to America, it became clear that Musharraf was not weak.

Purges and Promotions: Musharraf Tightens His Grip

Meanwhile, Musharraf and his loyal commanders began their own preparations for a potential coup. The 111 Brigade, based in Rawalpindi and responsible for protecting key democratic institutions, began practicing drills to overthrow the democracy.

At the army’s General Headquarters (GHQ), a squadron of tanks and three hundred troops had been deployed. These units were operating outside the normal military chain of command and answered only to General Musharraf himself.

On September 21, the staff at the Prime Minister’s official residence noticed army soldiers patrolling all around the building, wearing headsets and carrying walkie-talkies.

“What is all this?” Nawaz Sharif demanded an explanation.

Security agencies claimed there was a threat of attacks on the Prime Minister’s House and that the army was just revising the security procedures.

But Nawaz’s sixth sense warned him that Musharraf was doing all this to tap the Prime Minister’s phones. So, whenever Nawaz spoke to his allies, he would turn up the volume on the television to drown out their conversations.

Nawaz also sped up his own plan to remove Musharraf. He called his son, Hussain Nawaz, back from London for support. However, at the same time, he was pretending to reassure Musharraf that he had no intention of removing him. To sell this lie, he even appointed Musharraf to the additional post of Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Meanwhile, to please the Americans, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif held a press conference in Islamabad on October 7th. He announced that his government was demanding the closure of militant training camps in Afghanistan.

In her book, ‘From Kargil to Coup,’ Nasim Zehra writes that the Army Chief (Musharraf) found out that the Commander of the Southern Corps, General Tariq Pervez, was meeting with Nawaz Sharif. Musharraf immediately fired him from his command. This made General Tariq Pervez furious. Musharraf also demoted another of Nawaz’s sympathetic generals, Corps Commander General Saleem Haider, to the lower post of Master General of Ordnance.

Sharif was angry that his few allied generals in the army were being fired and demoted.

The Final Countdown: A Secret Meeting in the Sky

Now, it was only a question of timing. Both men were waiting for the right moment to strike. The Prime Minister knew that Musharraf was scheduled to travel outside Pakistan in October to attend the 50th-anniversary celebrations of the Sri Lankan army. The Army Chief was due to return home on October 12th.

Nawaz Sharif thought this was the perfect time. His plan was to dismiss Musharraf and appoint his own chosen Army Chief at the exact moment Musharraf’s flight was leaving Colombo to return to Pakistan.

On October 10, 1999, Nawaz Sharif left for Dubai to meet Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan. He used this trip as a cover for a secret meeting. He took along the ISI Chief General Ziauddin Butt, his son Hussain Nawaz, his speechwriter, and journalist Nazir Naji.

Nawaz and his allies were sure no one could listen to their conversations on the plane. Throughout the flight, Nawaz whispered constantly with General Ziauddin Butt. They were likely finalizing their plan, or conspiracy, to remove Musharraf.

Then the day finally arrived when the game was about to flip.

Find out what happened next in the following part.

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